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ARTICLES
The Hidden Costs of Lawyer Mobility:

Of Law Firms, Law Schools, and
the Education of Lawyers*
BY ROBERT W. HILLMAN"

T

hese comments address the consequences of nearly two decades of
lawyer mobility and law firm destabilization and offer some
thoughts on how lawyer mobility is, or at least should be, bringing into
sharper focus the professional education mission of law schools.
In the thirty or so years that I have been in the legal profession, the
values and assumptions underlying the practice of law have undergone
profound changes. The young lawyer of my generation could look forward
to joining a law firm, working hard for five to eight years, and, with a little
luck, becoming a partner in the firm.
In the past, becoming a partner in a law firm was a little like getting
married-both the firm and the lawyer approached the relationship as a
long-term mutual commitment. For this reason, it was not at all uncommon
to see a lawyer spend his or her entire career at a single law firm. Indeed,
such a relationship was the expectation rather than the exception. This was
the era of stable law firms.
An environment of law firm stability was supported by the culture of
the profession as well as the state of the law. Firms generally avoided
recruiting experienced lawyers and focused instead on developing their
practices through the hiring and training of recent law school graduates.
Mature lawyers had only limited opportunities to change firms. A firm
focused on hiring bright but inexperienced lawyers so that it could impress
upon its young associates the ways that firm liked to practice law. This
reflected belief in a certain brand identity associated with professional
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practice. Each firm sought to differentiate its product from that of its
competitors.
Stable firm membership was supported by lockstep compensation, a
method of income allocation that has largely, although not entirely,
disappeared from the scene. Under lockstep compensation, the longer a
lawyer stays with a firm, the greater that lawyer's compensation. Combined
with a culture that, discouraged lawyer movement among firms, it is not
surprising that law firms in an era of lockstep compensation enjoyed
remarkable stability. You paid your dues and eventually you enjoyed the
payback. Just be patient.
This is the environment that existed when I began to practice law. I was
the forty-fourth lawyer to join my firm. The year was 1974, and the firm
proudly boasted that no one had ever left the firm. More than a decade
before John Grisham's bestselling thriller gave new meaning to such
statements,' the claim seemed innocent enough, if a bit nalve. I'm not sure
if I was the first to leave the firm, but I can say with certainty that many
lawyers left after I did, and continue to leave, thus assigning to the dustbin
of history the now quaint notion of a long-term commitment to a law firm.
Of course, there is nothing unusual about the departures from my
former firm. No law firm in the United States may safely assume that its
future will be free of the type of heavy turnover, unknown when my
generation entered law practice. Indeed, there are indications that the
culture of lawyer mobility that originated in the United States is now
beginning to take hold abroad.2 This is the era of lawyer mobility and law
firm destabilization.
Such is the frequency of movement of lawyers among firms that, for
good reason, the New York Court of Appeals has referred to the revolving
door as a "modem day law firm fixture." 3 Law firms and legal recruitment
firms openly solicit lawyers with "portable clients," and the lawyer without
a "book of business" will never be more than an employee of the firm. The
Internet helps us see this clearly. Of the numerous web sites touching
on the various facets of lawyer mobility, my personal favorite is
lateralattorneys.com,4 which openly solicits for placement "partners with
See JOHN GRISHAM, THE FIRM (1991) (account of an associate who came to
regret accepting an offer that seemed too, good to be true).
2See,

e.g., Alexander J. Black, CanadianLawyer Mobility and Law Society
Conflict of Interest, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 118 (1994).

3Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1180
(N.Y. 1995).
4The site can be accessed at http://www.lateralattoneys.com (last visited Nov.
14, 2002).
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portables" and, if that is not lurid enough, offers to "assist entire practice
groups in relocating to new firms."5
For more than a decade, I have been writing about lawyer mobility
trends, but I must confess that direct recruitments of this nature still
surprise me With their boldness. Younger lawyers view my astonishment
with some amusement and see nothing unusual about open solicitations of
entire practice groups. This is the only environment that they have known,
and the days before lawyer mobility became an integral part of the culture
of the profession seem very long ago. Young lawyers may simply be
unaware of the recency of the changes I am describing. If that is so, they
need only ask older lawyers what law firms were like in the era when it was
considered unethical, according to the ABA, for lawyers to leave a firm and
take clients with them 6
For just a moment, reflect on this rather remarkable and sudden change
in the culture of the profession. To repeat, there are many lawyers
practicing today who began their careers when written ethics norms held
that it was improper for a lawyer (let alone an entire practice group) to
leave a firm and in the process take its clients.
The changes I am describing have paralleled restructurings taking place
throughout society. Comparisons may be drawn to corporate takeovers and
the development ofa market for corporate control that achieved efficiencies
through assaults on entrenched and nonresponsive managements. Throughout the country, professional and commercial firms are restructuring in
ways that elevate efficiency over long-standing norms of loyalty and
longevity. The developments in the legal profession that I have been
describing are simply an extension of private sector restructurings in' the
name of efficiency.
Indications of the change-to-come could be seen beginning in the mid1970s in the form of increased competition throughout the legal profession.
Law school enrollments surged. With the ranks of lawyers swelling,
competition for clients became intense and traditional ethics norms that
operated to restrain competition were relaxed quietly. Law firms embarked
on growth strategies impossible to achieve solely on the basis of "promotion from within" policies. Firms abandoned lockstep compensation in
5 Id.

ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961) (A restrictive
covenant in contract with an association was unenforceable in part because it was
unnecessary: "A former employee of a lawyer or a law firm would be bound by
these canons to refrain from any effort to secure the work of clients of his former
employer.").
6 See
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favor of rewarding more productive partners and lawyers with loyal client
followings greater and greater percentages of their firms' revenue streams.
Firms unwilling to change soon lost partners or entire departments in this
new era of lawyer mobility and lateral hiring. The casualty of all of this
sudden change was the rapidly antiquated notion of loyalty to thefirm.
Although I do not intend to dwell in these remarks on the law of lawyer
mobility, the role of law in encouraging and perhaps even supporting
changes in the culture of the profession deserves at least passing mention.
Since the late 1980s, an impressive body of case law has developed dealing
with lawyer mobility issues. Unquestionably, courts have been quite
supportive of trends in lawyer mobility.
Consider, for example, the first major case on lawyer mobility, the
1989 Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord opinion out of New York.7 In that case,
Cohen, a tax partner of twenty years, left the Lord, Day & Lord firm and
joined another New York firm. Relying on a forfeiture-for-competition
clause in its partnership agreement, Lord, Day & Lord refused to pay
Cohen the value of his partnership interest. Cohen sued the firm and
prevailed. In striking down the firm's attempt to contractually restrain
competition, a divided New York Court of Appeals observed that the clause
"constitute[d] an impermissible restriction on the practice of law" that
operated to undermine the interests of clients.' With just a handful of
exceptions, courts have followed the Cohen lead and voided direct and
indirect contractual restraints on competition by withdrawing partners.'
Law, in short, supports lawyer mobility and the destabilization of law
firms.
Some commentators, including the Chief Justice of the United States,
seem nostalgic about the days in which lawyers remained loyal to their
firms.1" On the whole, however, the development of lawyer mobility has
yielded substantial positive results. I doubt that many lawyers would want
to return to a world in which younger partners worked for years to support
the lifestyle of older partners whose major contributions to their firms
could only be expressed in the past tense. Competition creates opportuni78 Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989).
1d. at 411.
' See generally ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY § 2.3
(1998).
0See William H. Rehnquist, The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND. L.J. 151,
152 (1987) ("Institutional loyalty appears to be in decline. Partners in law firms
have become increasingly 'mobile,' feeling much freer than they formerly did and
having much greater opportunity than they formerly did, to shift from one firm to
another and take revenue-producing clients with them.").
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ties, and the beneficiaries of change are the hard-working, talented lawyers
with loyal clients. Successful lawyers are no longer trapped within their law
firms. This is as it should be.
Still, there are costs associated with lawyer mobility. Unfortunately,
because these costs are hidden, they have largely been ignored in the
commentary on the changing culture of the profession.
What are the true costs of lawyer mobility and law firm destabilization?
At one point, proponents of maintaining strong law firms by restraining
lawyer mobility could argue that clients would certainly demand and very
likely need stable law firms. In reality, however, destabilized law firms give
clients more choice. Sophisticated clients typically "hire the lawyer and not
the firm." They prefer an environment of competition." Indeed, it seems
very likely that law firm destabilization has lowered the cost of legal
services, at least in the market serving corporate and institutional clients.
That the voices of clients are absent from the chorus singing the blues of
lawyer mobility should surprise no one.
Who, then, are the casualties of recent lawyer mobility trends?
Certainly, many older lawyers without substantial client portfolios have
suffered greatly and undoubtedly yearn for a return to lockstep compensation systems that reward lawyers for longevity with a firm. This was, after
all, the deal promised to them when they entered the profession and joined
their firms. Demotions, layoffs, and assorted other indignities have faced
lawyers who for whatever reason are unable to command the loyalties of
portable clients. Although these are sad cases, they may simply represent
a reassessment of the value of legal skills in an environment in which
lawyers as technicians are, in a word, fungible.
Of greater concern is the plight of lawyers now entering the profession.
A growing number of law schools are subordinating professional training
to academic and social reform goals. They have done so assuming that law
firms will provide the training necessary for recent entrants to the
profession. Under this view, law schools provide the theoretical foundation
or social conscience and law firms develop more practical skills through the
training they provide in an extended period of post-graduate education.
The problem is that lawyer mobility serves as a disincentive for
investment by firms in the training and development of their lawyers.
Escalating salaries and associate turnover require that entry-level attorneys
generate substantial billable hours from the day they walk in the door and

"For a discussion of this point, see generally Robert W. Hillman, Loyalty in

the Firm: A Statement of General Principleson the Duties of PartnersWithdrawingfrom Law Firms, 55 WASH. &LEE L. REv. 997, 1010-11 (1998).
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begin consuming expensive overhead. Mentoring and other inefficient
activities, such as simply allowing associates to observe experienced
lawyers at work, are luxuries few firms can afford. To be sure, firms do
train their associates in a sense, but the emphasis is on an immediate return
on dollars invested in training rather on than the long-term development of
the lawyers being educated. Thus, when it occurs, training focuses on
structured, formalized programs emphasizing skills immediately needed in
the practice.
It may be instructive to reflect on how the associate development
activities of law firms have changed over the years. Here, we must rely on
anecdotal evidence rather than hard data, which is virtually nonexistent.
Lawyers of my generation may recall the accounts of older lawyers, some
of whom never attended law school, who spoke of apprentice-type training
where they "carried the briefcases" of experienced lawyers and learned
how to practice through mentoring and observation. They often would
speak with affection of the older lawyers who would spend hours talking
with them about law, strategy, ethics, and whatever else remotely related
to the cases they were handling. By modem standards, this training was
clearly inefficient.
By the time my generation entered the profession, law firms had
proliferated and assumed significant training responsibilities. Firms
accepted the fact that associates would not be "profitable" until at least
their third or fourth years, but this was manageable because associate
turnover was relatively low and, for the most part, controlled. The shortterm subsidization of inexperienced lawyers would easily be repaid as the
lawyers developed into mature professionals. The system was highly
rational even though it may seem inefficient by more modem measures of
firm performance.
Lawyers of my generation were not under early pressure to make long
term, irreversible career choices. For example, many large and mediumsized firms offered rotation programs for newly-hired law school graduates.
Typically, a rotation program allowed the inexperienced associate to spend
time in up to four practice areas over an extended period, normally two
years. Then, with the benefit of some significant experience, the lawyer
could decide to specialize in tax, or litigation, or real estate, or whatever
other practice area the firm may have offered. Some lawyers declined the
rotation option, preferring instead to specialize immediately. But many
associates were less sure about practice choices and greatly benefited from
the broad perspectives derived from exposure to various practice areas and
lawyering styles.
By modem standards, rotation programs are inefficient and, not
surprisingly, largely have disappeared. To be sure, some firms still claim
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to offer rotation programs, but the limitations of the offers become apparent
on a closer examination of what the firms actually are doing. One of the
preeminent firms in the country, for example, boasts of a training program
keyed to rotation of associates, but on a reading of the fine print it becomes
clear that the entire rotation occurs within a single department of the firm.' 2
At this firm, as well as at others, one can only hope that the recent law
school graduates joining the firm have sufficient information to make longterm specialization choices.
Further evidence of declining investment in lawyer development is seen
in the demise of traditional mentoring within firms. When properly
conducted, mentoring may involve extended periods in which the new
lawyer simply observes the experienced lawyer at work on such disparate
matters as negotiations, depositions, and client meetings. Even more
importantly, effective mentoring requires the experienced lawyer to take the
time to instruct the associate on the art and skill of practicing law
effectively. To be sure, mentoring of this nature always was hit-and-miss,
and not all associates were fortunate enough to have good mentors. But
when it happened, it worked very, very well. 3
Today, mentoring is not widely used or even tolerated because its costs
cannot easily be passed on to clients. 4 Firms may claim to support
mentoring, but they do so through formalized and structured programs.
Today, the typical pattern is for a firm to assign mentoring responsibilities
to its more senior lawyers. Not surprisingly, the "fit" between mentor and
mentee may leave much to be desired. Even assuming compatibility, an
environment stressing the maximization of billable hours by junior and
senior lawyers alike is not conducive to inefficient activities such as
mentoring.
'2 See Cravath, Swaine &Moore, LegalRecruiting,at http://www.cravath.com/

enter.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2002) ("Under our system of development and
training, we rotate each associate to different partners or groups of partners within
one of our four departments selected by the associate--Corporate, Litigation, Tax,
or Trusts & Estates.").
13For an excellent account of effective mentoring, see Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal
Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral
Formationof the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REv. 705, 721-22 (1998).
'" The Nebraska State Bar Association has a mentoring program designed to
ease the transition into the practice. See Nebraska State Bar Association, Member
Services, at http://www.nebar.com/memberinfo/services/mentor/index.htm (last
visited Oct. 16, 2002). Mentors must have at least ten years of practice experience.
The program serves an important need but is limited by the fact that mentor and
mentee are not within the same firm and do not jointly provide legal services.
Id.
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Although it is tempting to describe firms of the past as less profit
driven than contemporary firms and thus more able and willing to engage
in costly training activities, we must be careful not to be too naive in this
regard. One of the dirty little secrets of the past was the ability of firms to
pass on a wide array of costs, including mentoring and training costs, to
unsuspecting and trusting clients.' 5 But as clients became more sophisticated, they resisted subsidizing the training functions of law firms. With
this change, mentoring and related training activities were no longer the
beneficiaries of involuntary client subsidies. Without those subsidies, the
activities could not survive in a new era emphasizing law firm profit
margins and profitability-per-partner rankings.
I should make it clear that I am not recommending implementation of
intensive mentoring programs in law firms. The nature of mentoring is such
that it is not likely to succeed when implemented by managerial directive.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that mentoring would be fairly apportioned
across a group of young lawyers far more diverse than at any time in the
past. Rather than endorsing it for present times, I am simply using
mentoring to illustrate the changing environment of training within law
firms. Mentoring is expensive and there may exist more effective ways to
use limited training resources. But what those more effective ways may be
is an unasked question and a largely irrelevant one given the diminishing
resources devoted to the training of new lawyers.
To be sure, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that the decline in
the law firm's role in the training and development of lawyers is attributable only to lawyer mobility. Other factors also have undermined training
and development activities. Most notable in this regard is escalating
compensation for entry-level lawyers, a trend that partially but not perfectly
correlates with steady increases in the student debt levels of law school
graduates. High associate salaries squeeze profit margins and invite
management practices designed to improve the profitability of associates.
Although the environment is conducive to training aimed at improving an
associate's ability to accomplish the tasks at hand, longer term development
activities are not cost effective, particularly when there is no assurance that
the associate will remain with the firm for more than a year or two, if that
long.
The core problem is one of dwindling resources devoted by law firms
and law schools to the training and development of young lawyers.' 6 No
'5 See, e.g., Schiltz, supra note 13, at 742 (noting the relaxed monitoring of law
firm expenses by clients during the 1980s).
16 See generallyRobert W. Hillman, ProfessionalPartnerships,Competition,and
the Evolution of Firm Culture: The Case ofLaw Firms, 26 J. CORP. L. 1061 (2001);
Thomas Disare,A Lawyer's Education,7MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGALISSuES 359 (1996).
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one can argue that law practice is simpler today than it was in the past. To
the contrary, it is apparent that the challenges facing lawyers are greater
than they ever have been. Early in his or her career a lawyer needs to
consider such basic questions as how to resolve conflicts between truth and
advocacy, the role of candor in negotiations, correct responses to client or
attorney misconduct, the meaning and importance of document integrity,
and what, if any, compromises are appropriate in the quality of an attorney's work product in order to meet the pressures of time and cost. We are
fond of talking about the globalization of law practice, but how many
classes even raise the issue of whether a lawyer is obligated to respect
foreign law?
I am not suggesting that these are the most important questions to put
before law students, but I do believe that they illustrate the types of issues
deserving of development if law schools are to discharge even minimal
responsibilities in the area of professional education. I question whether
many law schools, especially those that seek "elite" status, are emphasizing
issues of character and values, not to mention exploring what it means to
be a professional. Many lawyers entering the profession today will not
receive substantial assistance from law schools in forming a broad
perspective on lawyering that can serve as a foundation for professional
development over the decades to come.
Consider the extent to which law students are exposed to the serious
17
issues of ethics that lawyers face at critical moments in their careers.
Many academics seem unwilling to integrate ethics issues into substantive
courses in such fundamental areas as criminal law, civil procedure, and
contracts. They may justify the inattention to matters of ethics because of
the existence of a separate and mandatory ethics course in the curriculum.
Although every law school has an ethics course, the instruction too often
is minimalist at best and generally is keyed to assisting students in passing
the ethics portion ofbar examinations. This should be recognized for what
it is-bar preparation, not fundamental training in ethical issues facing

17For an

excellent treatment of this issue, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION
UNDER LAWYERS 222-29 (1994).

s Cf Deborah L. Rhode, The ProfessionalResponsibilitiesofProfessors,51
J. LEGAL EDUC. 158, 158 (2001) ("Although virtually all law schools preach values
of professional responsibility and public service, few make any systematic or
sustained effort to institutionalize them in practice. Issues of legal ethics are
generally relegated to a specialized course and are missing or marginal elsewhere
in the curriculum.").
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practicing lawyers. Where is the discussion of the value of a reputation and
the importance of doing the right thing even when no one else is looking?
Of course, law schools will also point to the development of clinical
programs and "skills training" courses as signs of their commitment to
professional education.' In particular, the growth of clinical programs may
seem to be moving law schools closer to the medical school model, where
clinical education is an integral part of the curriculum.2" Any seeming
similarities between medical and legal education, however, do not survive
close scrutiny. In law schools, clinical education and skills courses lack
status and constitute a relatively small part of the educational program.
Moreover, their very existence may serve to remove the pressure on
teachers of more substantive (academic) courses to treat their subjects as
important components of professional education.
And so what is to be done?
In a perfect world that would allow us to start from scratch, we
certainly would not come up with a system for educating and training
lawyers even remotely resembling the one we have today. We would reexamine the traditional, three-year law school curriculum that has been in
place longer than any of us can remember.2' We would strike a sensible
balance between the academic and professional training activities of law
schools. We would consider post-graduate apprenticeship programsjointly
overseen by firms and schools to facilitate a well-conceived transition from
school to practice. And we would do everything possible to lower the cost
of a legal education so that heavy debt does not force recent graduates to
take the highest paying position without regard to training and development
issues.
The point on student debt bears special emphasis. The norm today is
for a student to incur $80,000 of debt for a legal education.22 This, of
course, is on top of a significant base of undergraduate debt that many
'9An example of such a program can be found at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
academics/clinical (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
20 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Grosberg, Medical Education Again Provides a
Model for Law Schools: The Standardized Patient Becomes the Standardized
Client, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 212, 213 (2001) ("Clinical education-learning by
doing and learning by observing doctors and teachers practicing medicine... has
long been an integral part of the medical school curriculum.").
2 The ABA accreditation requirements for a Program of Legal Education are
accessible at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter3.html (last visited
Jan. 23, 2003).
22 For data on the debt loads of law graduates, see Hillman, supra note 16, at

1082.

2002-2003]

THE HIDDEN COSTS OF LAWYER MOBILITY

students bring to their first class in law school. Lawyers and academics of
my generation may not fully appreciate the fact that the price of education
since we graduated has risen much faster than the overall rate of inflation.
There is no reason to believe that the alarming trends in place with respect
to undergraduate debt do not extend to law school debt as well. A recent
report outlines the rapid rise in undergraduate debt levels and notes that an
increasing percentage of college graduates enter the job force with
unmanageable levels of debt.23 The report adds:
Over the past ten years, after adjusting for inflation, the median family
income increased by 12%, while the average tuition and fees at four- year
public institutions increased by 40% and that at four-year private schools
by 33%. As family income in this country becomes more stratified, tuition
as a percentage of family income will continue to increase, particularly24for
low-income students, amplifying the average student's debt burden.
To this, I would simply add that the very substantial additional debt
burdens that students must incur in order to secure a professional degree in
law would seem to require some correlation between the education they are
financing and its relationship to their development as lawyers.
The "cutting edge" in legal education most assuredly has nothing to do
with issues affecting the profession. Although some law schools justly
pride themselves on the quality and affordability of the' professional
education they provide, a growing and far noisier group of law schools seek
status for their academic mission by consciously distancing themselves
from the professional education model. There is little incentive for deans
or faculty to commit meaningful energies and resources to the professional
development of lawyers rather than to,academic research and social reform
agendas. In the law school world, prestige cannot be gained by success in
professional education.
Even if some schools were bold enough to be innovative and responsive
to changes in the profession, they would face substantial resistance to any
departures from the existing norms of legal education.2 5 Most notable in
King & Ellynne Bannon, The Burden ofBorrowing:A Reporton
the Rising Rates of Student Loan Debt (The State PIRG's Higher Education
Project, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2001, available at www.pirg.org/highered/
BurdenofBorrowing.pdf.
24 Id. at 6 (citing The College Board, 2001, Trends in College Pricing).
25 See Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1355
(2002) (noting that "accreditation and informal systems of ranking have reinforced
a 'one-size-fits-all' model of law schools that discourages innovation and specialization.") (footnote omitted).
23 See Tracey
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this regard are the pressures emanating from an accreditation process that
operates to maintain the status quo and discourage innovation. This is
supported by published law school rankings reflecting a unitary model of
legal education by measuring the worth of all law schools by reference to
the standards of the elite few.26 In an environment that claims to celebrate
diversity, there is a monotonous sameness among law schools.
Although the debate over the professional versus academic orientation
of law schools is nothing new, the questions it poses are assuming an
urgency unknown in the past. Law schools no longer have the luxury of
relying on law firms to fill the gaps in foundational professional education.
If issues of lawyer development and training are of secondary importance
to law schools, then perhaps we have a significant problem of institutional
accountability that needs to be addressed.
But that is for another time, and another Article. For present purposes,
I am content to highlight one of the more significant but hidden costs of the
destabilization of law firms resulting from lawyer mobility. No longer may
law firms be relied upon to provide fundamental postgraduate education as
well as an orderly transition into the practice of law. Unless we are willing
to assume that these were unimportant functions being performed by firms
of the past, we will sooner or later have to address the question-who
should pick up the slack? The answer, I suggest, is obvious.

The widely used U.S. News rankings are accessible at http://usnews.com/
usnews/edu/grad/rankings/law/lawindex.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
26

